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capital (mainly the amount of stockholder equity) to average
total assets (an average of aggregate assets over a set time
period, usually two years). Congress furthered the push by
passing the International Lending and Supervision Act of
1983 (ILSA). The legislation ushered in a common definition
of uniform capital requirements for all bank regulatory
agencies to use. 
In 1985, under the auspices of ISLA, the standard 
mandated capital ratio for banks converged on 5.5 percent 
of total assets. Any bank operating at a leverage ratio of 
3 percent was declared unsound and was required to comply
with federal enforcement actions.
By 1986, however, regulators began to realize that the
ratio failed to differentiate between different sorts of risks
on the bank’s balance sheets. The simple ratio, by definition,
ranked all assets as being equally likely to maintain their
value. But during the 1980s, financial markets were becom-
ing vastly more international in scope and innovations in
financial products were introducing a new element of risk
into bank holdings. Besides, many banks were beginning to
move away from lower-yielding liquid assets while also
experimenting with “off-balance-sheet” activities that
would allow them to make certain higher-yield (but riskier)
investments. Under the old rules, they didn’t have to
increase the size of their capital cushion as a result.
The Basel Accord and U.S. Policy 
In the summer of 1988, central bank governors from the 10
biggest economies (also called the Group of Ten, or G-10)
met in the town of Basel, Switzerland, to approve an agree-
ment — eventually called Basel I — that would set the
approach that bank regulators would take for the next 18
years. The first big result of the accord was to redefine the
way regulators in each participating country measure 
capital. It created two “tiers” — Tier 1 (core) capital and Tier
2 (supplementary) capital. Tier 1 is basically equity owned by
common stockholders while Tier 2 consists of a variety of
other forms of capital, such as a “hybrid” equity instrument
like preferred stock that resembles equity in some form but
also maintains a liability claim on the bank in the event of
bankruptcy. 
The next new step was to break away from a simplistic,
uniform approach to capital ratios and instead create a series
of risk categories into which the assets of a bank can be sub-
divided. A“risk weight” would then be assigned to each class
of asset for the purposes of taking into account the potential
for a loss in value or probability of default: The higher the
risk weight, the more capital the bank needs to have on hand
to compensate for the potential loss. Those ranged from a
“0.0 percent” risk weight for bonds issued by the govern-
ments of most developed countries to a “100 percent” risk
weight for corporate debt. Mortgages fell in the middle (a 50
percent weight). Off-balance-sheet assets were also included
in these “risk buckets” and weighted by a similar risk factor. 
To calculate the risk-weighted capital ratio, regulators
would sum the new weighted values of the assets before they
calculated the capital-to-asset result. The standard would
require banks to hold capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) that consist-
ed of 8 percent of their newly defined risk-weighted assets.
Coincidentally, the year after the original Basel Accord
was agreed upon and the standards began to be adopted by 
a number of countries — over 100 by the year 2002 — the
United States witnessed the largest number of bank failures
since the Great Depression. More than 530 FDIC-insured
banks failed in 1989. The concern among policy-
makers at the time was about “regulatory forbearance” — in
other words, the act of looking the other way when a 
regulator discovered that a bank might be in jeopardy of 
collapsing. 
Analysts of the period often point out that bank regula-
tors were aware of many of the warning signs and the losses
from the S&Lcrisis of the 1980s were made worse than they
might have been. “The consequent increased pressure to
forbear from managers and owners in the industry,
unchecked by an offsetting increased pressure to facilitate
early closure, may have led to changes in favor of such poli-
cies in the 1980s,” write economists Randall Kroszner of the
University of Chicago and Philip Strahan of Boston College
in a 1996 paper. (Kroszner subsequently served as a
Governor at the Federal Reserve Board.)
Partly in response to this concern, Congress passed 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act (FDICIA) in 1991. It created a set of categories to 
classify the capitalization of a bank. A bank was “well 
capitalized” if it had a risk-weighted capital ratio of 10 
percent or more. It was “adequately capitalized” at 8 percent
or more. Below 8 percent was considered “under-
capitalized.” The law mandated “prompt corrective action”
by regulators to shut down banks that were considered
undercapitalized and failed to meet other criteria. The
purpose was to minimize the potential cost to taxpayers of
the government’s deposit insurance guarantees by heading
off a potential bank collapse while a bank still had a positive,
but low, capital ratio. 
The Rise of Basel II
Soon, a variety of inherent flaws in Basel I’s treatment of
capital became apparent. First, the relationship between
assets’ actual revealed default risk and their risk weights
proved to be less reliable than had been thought. For
instance, all bonds issued by countries that were members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) were given the same weight even
though doing so might have downplayed the very real 
differences in the risk of defaults among these countries or,
conversely, possibly overstated the difference in default risks
between OECD and non-OECD countries. 
Second, the Basel methodology was too crude. It simply
summed the risk weights to construct a measure of overall
capital risk, but that is a poor proxy for actual risk. Doing so
does not take into account the overall portfolio risk of 
the bank and the formula made no room for management
Spring 2009 • Region Focus 7 6 Region Focus • Spring 2009
T
he recent “stress test” the
federal government conducted
on the nation’s biggest banks
was an attempt to ascertain whether
those depository institutions could
withstand a market downturn. This
new form of bank examination was
meant to quell some of the uncer-
tainty among investors about the value
of the assets the banks were holding
on their balance sheets as well as
whether these banks had enough
capital on hand to keep them stand-
ing in the wake of an extended 
economic storm.
Banks can finance their operations
in two ways. They can borrow money
— or accept more deposits from their
customers, which by definition is a
form of borrowing since the bank is
required to return the full deposit bal-
ance if demanded by the customer —
or they can sell stock. Banks can then
turn around and lend this money to
others. (The loans the banks extend 
to others are considered assets since
they generate income for the bank
through the interest payments made
by borrowers.) 
When a bank borrows money to
fund its operations, this creates a liabil-
ity that can cause the bank to fail if it
cannot meet its repayment obliga-
tions. On the other hand, the revenue
generated by a stock sale is considered
“capital” since it can be used to pay 
off depositors or bondholders if neces-
sary. Thus, the larger the portion of the
bank’s operations that are financed by
capital funds, the more losses the bank
can absorb.  
Measuring how much capital a bank
has on hand relative to its assets has
become an important function of the
bank regulatory system. The main 
regulators of the U.S. banking system
— the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the
Federal Reserve,










One of the 
metrics by which
this adequacy is
measured is a 
capital-to-assets
ratio. While this
might sound like a simple concept to
operationalize, the proper role for the
ratio in regulatory policy is far from
settled. In addition, current events
have raised questions regarding the old
assumptions about how best to define
a bank’s capital cushion.   
ABrief History 
The numeric standards that the cur-
rent capital adequacy requirements are
based on are relatively new. Before the
1980s, bank supervisors did not
impose a specific quantitative capital
requirement on a bank. Instead,
through most of the country’s history,
an institution’s solvency was based
largely on an examiner’s judgment.
Supervisors had the freedom to take a
look at each bank individually and use
formal and informal measures and
their knowledge of each bank’s circum-
stances to form their views. 
Rigid adherence to something
quantitative like a capital ratio was still
widely perceived to discourage a 
more comprehensive and thoughtful
analysis of a bank’s potential solvency
in the face of an economic shock. For
instance, the American Bankers
Associations 1954 “Statement of
Principles” explicitly rejected the use
of ratios as a centerpiece of bank
supervision. Even as late as 1978, the
FDIC Manual of Examination Policies
— the rulebook for that agency’s bank
auditors — instructed their examiners
to use capital ratios as only “a first
approximation of a bank’s ability to
withstand adversity. Alow capital ratio
by itself is no more conclusive of a
bank’s weakness than a high ratio is of
its invulnerability.”
This was a sustainable strategy for
bank examiners from the 1940s
through the early 1970s. Bank failures
were few in number and in scope dur-
ing that time. The dollar-weighted
average capital ratio for the banking
industry remained healthy also, rang-
ing from 6 percent to 8 percent
between 1950 and 1970. 
The high-inflation environment of
the mid- to late-1970s led to high inter-
est rates that severely weakened large
banks and the savings and loan (S&L)
industry. In 1981, the federal regulators
introduced an explicit capital ratio
requirement for the first time. It con-
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divided. A“risk weight” would then be assigned to each class
of asset for the purposes of taking into account the potential
for a loss in value or probability of default: The higher the
risk weight, the more capital the bank needs to have on hand
to compensate for the potential loss. Those ranged from a
“0.0 percent” risk weight for bonds issued by the govern-
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banks failed in 1989. The concern among policy-
makers at the time was about “regulatory forbearance” — in
other words, the act of looking the other way when a 
regulator discovered that a bank might be in jeopardy of 
collapsing. 
Analysts of the period often point out that bank regula-
tors were aware of many of the warning signs and the losses
from the S&Lcrisis of the 1980s were made worse than they
might have been. “The consequent increased pressure to
forbear from managers and owners in the industry,
unchecked by an offsetting increased pressure to facilitate
early closure, may have led to changes in favor of such poli-
cies in the 1980s,” write economists Randall Kroszner of the
University of Chicago and Philip Strahan of Boston College
in a 1996 paper. (Kroszner subsequently served as a
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Act (FDICIA) in 1991. It created a set of categories to 
classify the capitalization of a bank. A bank was “well 
capitalized” if it had a risk-weighted capital ratio of 10 
percent or more. It was “adequately capitalized” at 8 percent
or more. Below 8 percent was considered “under-
capitalized.” The law mandated “prompt corrective action”
by regulators to shut down banks that were considered
undercapitalized and failed to meet other criteria. The
purpose was to minimize the potential cost to taxpayers of
the government’s deposit insurance guarantees by heading
off a potential bank collapse while a bank still had a positive,
but low, capital ratio. 
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Soon, a variety of inherent flaws in Basel I’s treatment of
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assets’ actual revealed default risk and their risk weights
proved to be less reliable than had been thought. For
instance, all bonds issued by countries that were members of
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though doing so might have downplayed the very real 
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conversely, possibly overstated the difference in default risks
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 strategies that could reduce that overall risk. Abank portfo-
lio can indeed be more or less risky than the mere sum of 
its parts might indicate because of the correlation among
assets.
Third, the broad categories were lumped together, and
assigned a single weight to a variety of assets that in reality
exist along a spectrum of risk profiles. A loan to a startup
company, for instance, was treated the same as one to an
established Fortune 500 company. As such, banks investing
the same share of their portfolio in either asset would have
identical mandatory capital set aside. This creates an incen-
tive for a bank to invest in high-yielding assets in the risky
end of the spectrum without having to make a correspon-
ding expansion of their capital cushion. This sort of activity
could over time increase the overall risk of a bank’s portfolio
although it would still meet Basel I standards.
In January of 2001, a second set of Basel standards —
called Basel II — attempted to remedy these problems. 
(The implementation by the Federal Reserve began in the
fall of 2006.) The first big change altered the risk weight. By
using the ratings issued by credit rating agencies like
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s to determine the potential
risk of default, Basel II set up a system by which assets with-
in each broad “risk bucket” could be further classified. 
The second big change was a new method by which risk
profiles could be measured. Instead of forcing all banks to
abide by the specific numeric standards set forth in Basel II,
certain banks could opt out. In place of the top-down
approach, the “internal ratings based” approach — available
only to sophisticated banks with the resources and knowl-
edge base to develop an internal rating with a mathematic
model — allowed some banks to estimate the necessary size
of their own capital cushion.  
Both changes were aimed at answering the critics who
stated that the original Basel standards did not integrate any
market-based mechanisms for evaluating risk. Yet these
changes seem to have proven flawed as well. The grades
awarded by the ratings agencies for some mortgage-backed
securities, for instance, have been shown to be less reliable
than originally hoped. Some argue it’s hard to make a case
that a handful of firms which are largely insulated from com-
petition by the Securities and Exchange Commission, as the
“Big Three” ratings agencies are, could be considered a suffi-
cient market-based mechanism. (For a detailed analysis, see
this issue’s cover story on page 14.) 
In addition, allowing banks to set their own capital
requirements doesn’t seem to acknowledge the current state
of the science of risk management. It has become apparent
that the models of risk used by many banks may not have
been sufficiently robust to anticipate the potential default of
complex new asset-backed securities. 
There has been some discussion within the Federal
Reserve about how to overcome the incentive a bank would
have to lowball their capital requirement estimates. One way
to create an incentive for banks to be as honest as possible is
to require them to precommit to a maximum loss exposure
and corresponding capital buffer. If the bank’s losses exceed
the declared maximum, the bank supervisor would levy a
fine on the bank. 
A criticism of the precommitment approach centers on
the ability and willingness of a regulator to assess fines. For
the fines to be a credible threat, they must be large enough
to spur action by the bank. But if an economic shock were to
reduce a bank’s soundness, a regulator might feel compelled,
if he believed the shock to be temporary, to avoid assessing
the fine if doing so would result in the bank’s failure. Yet the
failure to issue a penalty, especially if it is sufficiently steep
for the precommitment regime to work, would severely
restrict the credibility of the regulatory threat in the future. 
The Search for a Market-Based Mechanism
Critics of the Basel standards have pointed out that 
each round of changes has yet to address a key conceptual 
problem: Banks face a variety of risks that cannot be cap-
tured by a simple ratio. There is no attention paid to the
risks of a heavy concentration of a bank’s balance sheet in a
certain sort of investment. And a ratio has no way to gauge
the risks of poor management, the risks of an economic
shock, and the risks to reputation in the marketplace.
Critics argue that a real market-based mechanism that does
not rely almost solely on credit rating agencies or mathe-
matical models would be better suited to managing not just
the capital ratios of a bank but also these other intangible
risk factors that those institutions face.  
One proposal is to require large banks to hold a certain
portion of their assets in long-term subordinated debt. 
This form of debt would be uninsured — meaning it has no
claim to a federal guarantee — and would have a maturity 
of more than a year. The term “subordinated” means that 
the holders of these bonds are in line for repayment 
behind depositors, conventional bondholders, and the
FDIC should the bank fail. The bonds could be traded in a
secondary market.
Supporters of this proposal suggest that these character-
istics would be important for making this form of debt a
strong market-based barometer of a bank’s capital position.
Because these bondholders would be among the last to get
paid in the event of a bank failure, they would have an incen-
tive to monitor the bank’s relative riskiness. Subordinated
debt holders would be watchful of the bank’s levels of lever-
age because that level would influence not just the
probability of the bank’s failure but also the composition of
risks on its balance sheet — and, consequently, the bank’s
ability to repay subordinated bondholders in the event of
failure. Finally, because the bonds can be traded in secondary
markets, the risk yield would go up on the debt in the event
of a market perception that the bank is taking on too much
risk, thus sending a signal to both regulators and investors.  
As Charles Calomiris of Columbia University and Robert
Litan of the Kauffman Foundation argue, a subordinated
debt requirement could be preferable to the current Basel
standard that encourages more equity financing of banks.
Stockholders of a bank are likely to be more concerned
about the bank’s profitability and, hence, more interested in
the bank making high-yield, potentially risky investments.
As Calomiris and Litan point out in a 2000 study, “because
holders of subordinated debt have no upside other than the
interest they are promised, they are likely to be less risk
seeking than shareholders.” They argue that these debt 
holders would also have a relatively longer time horizon 
than a stockholder because of the long-term nature of the
bond maturities. And they suggest that, because a portion 
of the bonds will mature regularly, a subordinated debt
requirement on banks would force those banks to prove
themselves in the credit markets on a regular basis.
A criticism of the subordinated debt proposal suggests
that a secondary market for the asset may not emerge. The
amount of debt outstanding, particularly for a small bank,
might be too small for the market to be robust. Also, because
the proposal relies on the assumption that the bondholders
are relatively risk averse, they may be unusually sensitive to
new information and rush to redeem the debt after hearing
isolated pieces of bad economic news. 
Another criticism of the subordinated debt is that polit-
ical realities might make it a less effective tool at controlling
risk. In a world of deposit insurance and central govern-
ments unable to credibly commit to not bail out failing
banks, the upside of risk is privatized — by allowing the
bank’s stockholders to keep the profits of successful gambles
— but the downside is socialized because the government
ensures that the bank’s debtors don’t suffer. This creates an
incentive for banks to make even riskier investments than
they would otherwise. Meanwhile, the price of bank debt
will be influenced by the implicit or explicit insurance 
guarantee, and the debt price would not necessarily yield
accurate information about a bank’s level of risk.
One way to control risk more directly is to approach the
question from the other end by limiting the net return a
bank can make and thereby limit its incentive to take too
much risk. This can be done by requiring banks to issue
stock warrants. Edward Simpson Prescott, an economist at
the Richmond Fed, argues this requirement would alter a
bank’s capital structure in such a way as to replicate the
incentives that a bank would face in a world in which deposit
insurance and bondholder guarantees didn’t exist. 
The stock warrants would contain a strike price — a set
price at which the holders of the warrant could purchase a
share of bank equity. If the per-share return a bank experi-
ences is higher than the strike price, then the warrant holder
could exercise his option to buy the stock at the predeter-
mined price and reap the gains. The bank, on the other hand,
would only receive the price of the stock. Selling a stock war-
rant would, in other words, be equivalent to selling a portion
of the bank’s return to a set of investors. This would have the
effect of constraining the upper-end payoff a bank could
reap if the managers pursued a risky yet potentially high-
yield investment and should limit the incentive that banks
have to engage in such behavior.
A potential risk here is that a stock warrant could 
penalize a bank that exhibits high returns generated by inno-
vation or better management rather than risky leveraged
investments. There are also political economy issues. Bank
warrants can tip the balance of power away from bank man-
agers, and a proposal to require warrants are likely to be 
met with opposition. Additionally, by definition a stock war-
rant requirement would work best with a lower equity
capital requirement; high capital requirements choke 
off investment. Yet it’s likely that a proposal to allow a low-
ering of capital requirements would be met with skepticism
today.   
As the economic downturn unfolds, the debate about 
the correct regulatory approach to capital buffers and the
best way to integrate market-based mechanisms will 
continue. Bank regulation, by its nature, is often backward-
looking, adjusting to new financial innovations after they
become widespread. Some critics question whether the
attempts to continually modify capital standards can ever
keep up. 
Nevertheless, capital ratios are quite firmly embedded in
U.S. law now. Yet it remains an open question whether the
spirit of the Basel II standards will survive intact. The Basel
Committee responded to the situation in the worldwide
financial markets in a November 2008 press release that rec-
ognized the “fundamental weaknesses” of Basel II and
proposed a goal of modifying the standards once again by
the end of 2009.    RF
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changes seem to have proven flawed as well. The grades
awarded by the ratings agencies for some mortgage-backed
securities, for instance, have been shown to be less reliable
than originally hoped. Some argue it’s hard to make a case
that a handful of firms which are largely insulated from com-
petition by the Securities and Exchange Commission, as the
“Big Three” ratings agencies are, could be considered a suffi-
cient market-based mechanism. (For a detailed analysis, see
this issue’s cover story on page 14.) 
In addition, allowing banks to set their own capital
requirements doesn’t seem to acknowledge the current state
of the science of risk management. It has become apparent
that the models of risk used by many banks may not have
been sufficiently robust to anticipate the potential default of
complex new asset-backed securities. 
There has been some discussion within the Federal
Reserve about how to overcome the incentive a bank would
have to lowball their capital requirement estimates. One way
to create an incentive for banks to be as honest as possible is
to require them to precommit to a maximum loss exposure
and corresponding capital buffer. If the bank’s losses exceed
the declared maximum, the bank supervisor would levy a
fine on the bank. 
A criticism of the precommitment approach centers on
the ability and willingness of a regulator to assess fines. For
the fines to be a credible threat, they must be large enough
to spur action by the bank. But if an economic shock were to
reduce a bank’s soundness, a regulator might feel compelled,
if he believed the shock to be temporary, to avoid assessing
the fine if doing so would result in the bank’s failure. Yet the
failure to issue a penalty, especially if it is sufficiently steep
for the precommitment regime to work, would severely
restrict the credibility of the regulatory threat in the future. 
The Search for a Market-Based Mechanism
Critics of the Basel standards have pointed out that 
each round of changes has yet to address a key conceptual 
problem: Banks face a variety of risks that cannot be cap-
tured by a simple ratio. There is no attention paid to the
risks of a heavy concentration of a bank’s balance sheet in a
certain sort of investment. And a ratio has no way to gauge
the risks of poor management, the risks of an economic
shock, and the risks to reputation in the marketplace.
Critics argue that a real market-based mechanism that does
not rely almost solely on credit rating agencies or mathe-
matical models would be better suited to managing not just
the capital ratios of a bank but also these other intangible
risk factors that those institutions face.  
One proposal is to require large banks to hold a certain
portion of their assets in long-term subordinated debt. 
This form of debt would be uninsured — meaning it has no
claim to a federal guarantee — and would have a maturity 
of more than a year. The term “subordinated” means that 
the holders of these bonds are in line for repayment 
behind depositors, conventional bondholders, and the
FDIC should the bank fail. The bonds could be traded in a
secondary market.
Supporters of this proposal suggest that these character-
istics would be important for making this form of debt a
strong market-based barometer of a bank’s capital position.
Because these bondholders would be among the last to get
paid in the event of a bank failure, they would have an incen-
tive to monitor the bank’s relative riskiness. Subordinated
debt holders would be watchful of the bank’s levels of lever-
age because that level would influence not just the
probability of the bank’s failure but also the composition of
risks on its balance sheet — and, consequently, the bank’s
ability to repay subordinated bondholders in the event of
failure. Finally, because the bonds can be traded in secondary
markets, the risk yield would go up on the debt in the event
of a market perception that the bank is taking on too much
risk, thus sending a signal to both regulators and investors.  
As Charles Calomiris of Columbia University and Robert
Litan of the Kauffman Foundation argue, a subordinated
debt requirement could be preferable to the current Basel
standard that encourages more equity financing of banks.
Stockholders of a bank are likely to be more concerned
about the bank’s profitability and, hence, more interested in
the bank making high-yield, potentially risky investments.
As Calomiris and Litan point out in a 2000 study, “because
holders of subordinated debt have no upside other than the
interest they are promised, they are likely to be less risk
seeking than shareholders.” They argue that these debt 
holders would also have a relatively longer time horizon 
than a stockholder because of the long-term nature of the
bond maturities. And they suggest that, because a portion 
of the bonds will mature regularly, a subordinated debt
requirement on banks would force those banks to prove
themselves in the credit markets on a regular basis.
A criticism of the subordinated debt proposal suggests
that a secondary market for the asset may not emerge. The
amount of debt outstanding, particularly for a small bank,
might be too small for the market to be robust. Also, because
the proposal relies on the assumption that the bondholders
are relatively risk averse, they may be unusually sensitive to
new information and rush to redeem the debt after hearing
isolated pieces of bad economic news. 
Another criticism of the subordinated debt is that polit-
ical realities might make it a less effective tool at controlling
risk. In a world of deposit insurance and central govern-
ments unable to credibly commit to not bail out failing
banks, the upside of risk is privatized — by allowing the
bank’s stockholders to keep the profits of successful gambles
— but the downside is socialized because the government
ensures that the bank’s debtors don’t suffer. This creates an
incentive for banks to make even riskier investments than
they would otherwise. Meanwhile, the price of bank debt
will be influenced by the implicit or explicit insurance 
guarantee, and the debt price would not necessarily yield
accurate information about a bank’s level of risk.
One way to control risk more directly is to approach the
question from the other end by limiting the net return a
bank can make and thereby limit its incentive to take too
much risk. This can be done by requiring banks to issue
stock warrants. Edward Simpson Prescott, an economist at
the Richmond Fed, argues this requirement would alter a
bank’s capital structure in such a way as to replicate the
incentives that a bank would face in a world in which deposit
insurance and bondholder guarantees didn’t exist. 
The stock warrants would contain a strike price — a set
price at which the holders of the warrant could purchase a
share of bank equity. If the per-share return a bank experi-
ences is higher than the strike price, then the warrant holder
could exercise his option to buy the stock at the predeter-
mined price and reap the gains. The bank, on the other hand,
would only receive the price of the stock. Selling a stock war-
rant would, in other words, be equivalent to selling a portion
of the bank’s return to a set of investors. This would have the
effect of constraining the upper-end payoff a bank could
reap if the managers pursued a risky yet potentially high-
yield investment and should limit the incentive that banks
have to engage in such behavior.
A potential risk here is that a stock warrant could 
penalize a bank that exhibits high returns generated by inno-
vation or better management rather than risky leveraged
investments. There are also political economy issues. Bank
warrants can tip the balance of power away from bank man-
agers, and a proposal to require warrants are likely to be 
met with opposition. Additionally, by definition a stock war-
rant requirement would work best with a lower equity
capital requirement; high capital requirements choke 
off investment. Yet it’s likely that a proposal to allow a low-
ering of capital requirements would be met with skepticism
today.   
As the economic downturn unfolds, the debate about 
the correct regulatory approach to capital buffers and the
best way to integrate market-based mechanisms will 
continue. Bank regulation, by its nature, is often backward-
looking, adjusting to new financial innovations after they
become widespread. Some critics question whether the
attempts to continually modify capital standards can ever
keep up. 
Nevertheless, capital ratios are quite firmly embedded in
U.S. law now. Yet it remains an open question whether the
spirit of the Basel II standards will survive intact. The Basel
Committee responded to the situation in the worldwide
financial markets in a November 2008 press release that rec-
ognized the “fundamental weaknesses” of Basel II and
proposed a goal of modifying the standards once again by
the end of 2009.    RF
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